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Summary
The CDC and National Institutes of Health (NIH) Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 
manual describes biosafety recommendations for work involving highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) (US Department 
of Health and Human Services [HHS], CDC. Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories, 5th ed. Atlanta, GA: 
CDC; 2009. HHS publication no. [CDC] 21-1112. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5). The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture Guidelines for Avian Influenza Viruses builds on the BMBL manual and provides additional biosafety 
and biocontainment guidelines for laboratories working with HPAI (US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service, Agricultural Select Agent Program. Guidelines for avian influenza viruses. Washington, DC: US Department of 
Agriculture; 2011. Available at http://www.selectagents.gov/Guidelines_for_Avian_Influenza_Viruses.html). The recommendations 
in this report, which are intended for laboratories in the United States, outline the essential baseline biosafety measures for working 
with the subset of influenza viruses that contain a hemagglutinin (HA) from the HPAI influenza A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage, 
including reassortant influenza viruses created in a laboratory setting. All H5N1 influenza virus clades known to infect humans 
to date have been derived from this lineage (WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group. Continued evolution of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza A [H5N1]: updated nomenclature. Influenza Other Respir Viruses 2012;6:1–5). In 2009, the NIH 
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules were amended to include specific biosafety 
and biocontainment recommendations for laboratories working with Recombinant Risk Group 3 influenza viruses, including 
HPAI H5N1 influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96-like H5 lineage. In February 2013, the NIH guidelines were 
further revised to provide additional biosafety containment enhancements and practices for research with HPAI H5N1 viruses that 
are transmissible among mammals by respiratory droplets (i.e., mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1) (National Institutes of 
Health, Office of Biotechnology Activities. NIH guidelines for research involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules. 
Appendix G-II-C-5: biosafety level 3 enhanced for research involving risk group 3 influenza viruses. Bethesda, MD: National 
Institutes of Health; 2013. Available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna/nih_guidelines_oba.html). The recent revisions to the NIH 
guidelines focus on a smaller subset of viruses but are applicable and consistent with the recommendations in this report. 
The biosafety recommendations in this report were developed by CDC with advice from the Intragovernmental Select Agents and 
Toxins Technical Advisory Committee, which is a panel composed of federal government subject-matter experts, and from public 
input received in response to the request for information that was published in the Federal Register on October 17, 2012 (US 
Department of Health and Human Services, CDC. Influenza viruses containing the hemagglutinin from the Goose/ Guangdong/1/96 
lineage; proposed rule; request for information and comment. 42 CFR, Part 73. Federal Register 2012;77:63783–5). Work with 
HPAI H5N1 virus should be conducted, at a minimum, at biosafety level 3 (BSL-3), with specific enhancements to protect workers, 
the public, animal health, and animal products. Original clinical specimens suspected of containing viruses of this lineage can 
only be handled at BSL-2 if the procedures do not involve the propagation of the virus. An appropriate biosafety level should be 
determined in accordance with a biosafety risk assessment. Additional information on performing biosafety risk assessments and 
establishing effective biosafety containment is available in the BMBL manual.
The material in this report originated in the Division of Select Agents 
and Toxins, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, 
Robbin S. Weyant, PhD, Director. 
Corresponding preparer: Denise Gangadharan, PhD, Division of 
Select Agents and Toxins, Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response, CDC. Telephone: 404-718-2018; E-mail: ghz7@cdc.gov.
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Introduction
During 2003–2011, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) received reports of approximately 600 confirmed cases 
of human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI) H5N1 viruses, with a mortality rate of approximately 
59% (1). To date, almost all human cases have been linked 
to close contact with infected poultry. Several reports of 
family clusters indicate that human-to-human transmission 
might occur, although infrequently, after prolonged and close 
contact with an infected person (2). All human cases reported 
during 2003–2011 have been caused by viruses containing the 
hemagglutinin from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage. 
Epidemiologic evidence indicates that once transmitted into 
a human host, HPAI H5N1 viruses might result in more 
severe disease than other subtypes of influenza (3). Recent 
studies designed to identify genetic elements related to the 
transmissibility of these viruses have produced mammalian 
and avian influenza viruses containing the hemagglutinin from 
the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage that are transmissible 
via respiratory droplets in the ferret model (4,5), which is 
considered to be the animal model most representative of 
human influenza (6). In response to these developments, CDC 
has developed the following biosafety guidelines for working 
with this lineage and specimens suspected of containing these 
viruses.
Background
Influenza A Nomenclature and the 
Importance of the Hemagglutinin Subtype
Influenza viruses are RNA viruses in the family 
Orthomyxoviridae. The influenza viruses are categorized into 
three main types on the basis of their antigenic properties: A, 
B, and C. Influenza A viruses, which are the most virulent 
to humans, are divided into subtypes and identified on the 
basis of two surface glycoproteins, hemagglutinin (HA or H) 
and neuraminidase (NA or N). Sixteen HA subtypes (H1 
to H16) and nine NA subtypes (N1 to N9) are known that 
circulate in wild birds; more divergent H and N subtypes 
recently have been isolated from bats (7,8). For example, an 
influenza A virus that has an H5 HA and an N1 NA would 
be designated as an H5N1 virus. The nomenclature of avian 
influenza viruses is based on a standardized format representing 
the influenza type, the host origin, the place of collection, 
the virus identification number, the year of isolation, and the 
influenza A subtype designation in parentheses. For example, 
A/chicken/Texas/309402/04 (H5N2) is an H5N2 influenza A 
virus that was collected from a chicken in Texas in 2004 and 
assigned the strain number 309402 (9,10).
Avian influenza virus strains are further classified as low 
or highly pathogenic on the basis of specific molecular 
determinants of the HA protein (e.g., nucleotide sequence) 
and the biologic behavior of the virus during in vitro and in 
vivo tests. Most avian influenza viruses are associated with 
mild disease in poultry and are referred to as low pathogenic 
avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. In contrast, avian influenza 
viruses that meet HPAI criteria typically are associated with 
severe illness and high mortality in poultry (11). All poultry 
outbreaks of HPAI have been caused by influenza A viruses of 
the subtypes H5 or H7 (12).
Cleavage of the HA molecule by host proteases is required 
for influenza viruses to infect cells and replicate. The cleavage 
site of the HA protein of many influenza viruses is recognized 
by trypsinlike proteases expressed on surface cells lining the 
respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts, which limits disease to 
those tissues. The polybasic cleavage site of HPAI viruses is 
recognized by a wide range of proteases that are distributed 
ubiquitously, resulting in virus replication in many tissues and 
systemic disease. Extrapulmonary dissemination of H5N1 
virus has been documented in some fatal cases of H5N1 virus 
infections in humans (13). The HA molecule also mediates 
binding of the influenza virus to host cells in the respiratory 
tract. Human influenza viruses preferentially bind to different 
receptors than avian influenza viruses (14). Although human 
influenza virus receptors are more prevalent in the upper 
respiratory tract, avian influenza virus receptors are more 
prevalent in the lower respiratory tract of humans. The ability 
of H5N1 viruses to bind and infect cells in the lungs might 
contribute to the severity of H5N1-induced viral pneumonia 
(15–17). Furthermore, a change from avian- to human-type 
receptor-binding specificity, as occurred with the pandemic 
strains of 1918 (H1N1), 1957 (H2N2), and 1968 (H3N2), is 
considered a critical step in the adaptation of avian influenza 
viruses to humans and the ability to transmit efficiently among 
humans (18–20). Findings from recent influenza studies in 
the ferret animal model indicate that laboratory-modified 
influenza viruses with certain mutations can be transmitted via 
respiratory droplets between ferrets (4,5). Ferrets are regarded 
in the scientific community as the best surrogate animal model 
for human infection with influenza viruses (6).
Because all H5N1 influenza virus clades known to infect humans 
have been derived from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage, 
and because the HA confers the ability to infect a wide range of 
host cells and therefore plays a key role in the pathogenicity of this 
virus in poultry and likely also in humans, biosafety guidelines are 
imperative for work with influenza viruses that contain an HA 
from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage (21).
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Applicable Regulations
All HPAI viruses are regulated by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) as select agents pursuant to section 
121.3(b) of Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations (9 CFR 
§121.3[b]). The select agent regulatory requirements include 
but are not limited to biosafety, security, incident response, 
training, and notification of theft, loss, and release (available at 
http://www.selectagents.gov). Avian influenza viruses classified 
as low pathogenic viruses, including H5 and H7 subtypes, 
are regulated by USDA pursuant to part 122 (Organisms and 
Vectors) of Title 9 of the CFR (9 CFR part 122). Additional 
information on the regulation of reassortant avian influenza 
viruses is available from USDA’s Guidelines for Avian Influenza 
Viruses (11).
On October 17, 2012, CDC published a request for 
information in the Federal Register to obtain input from 
interested parties of the public on the potential regulation 
of the agent and biosafety recommendations when working 
with influenza viruses containing an HA from the A/goose/
Guangdong/1/96 lineage (22). Responses to this notice, in 
conjunction with input from subject-matter experts, will be 
used by CDC to determine whether to regulate these viruses 
as U.S. Department of Health and Human Services select 
agents. The input received in response to this notice has been 
included in this report.  The recommendations in this report, 
which are intended for laboratories in the United States, outline 
the essential baseline biosafety measures for working with 
the subset of influenza viruses that contain an HA from the 
HPAI influenza A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage, including 
reassortant influenza viruses created in a laboratory setting.
Guidelines for Working with 
Influenza Viruses Containing an HA 
from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 
Lineage 
In response to publications examining the genetic changes 
that might enable currently circulating strains of influenza 
viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/95-like lineage to 
transmit among mammals by respiratory droplets (4,5), CDC 
developed biosafety recommendations for work with these 
viruses. The biosafety recommendations in this report were 
developed by CDC with advice from the Intragovernmental 
Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Committee, 
which is a panel composed of federal government subject-
matter experts, and from public input received in response 
to the request for information that was published in the 
Federal Register on October 17, 2012 (22). Specific guidelines 
regarding work with influenza viruses containing an HA 
from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage are presented in 
the following sections. The biosafety and biocontainment 
guidelines that follow apply to both laboratory-generated and 
natural isolates of HPAI viruses.
Occupational Health Guidelines for Work 
with Influenza Viruses Containing an HA 
from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 
Lineage
In addition to the biocontainment guidance in the following 
section, the following guidelines apply to work at all biosafety 
levels with influenza viruses containing an HA from the 
A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage. Before working with these 
agents, an occupational health plan should be developed 
in consultation with persons with the appropriate clinical 
expertise. This plan should include the following:
•	 A properly constituted respiratory protection program 
should exist that complies with Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration regulations 29 CFR §1910.134. 
A primary prerequisite before entering a laboratory for 
work with influenza viruses containing the HA from the 
A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage is respiratory protection. 
Either a powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) with a 
high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter or a properly 
fitted full-face respirator with HEPA or N95 particulate 
protection is required for work with these viruses and is 
applicable to all BSLs, with the exception of BSL-4 suit 
laboratories. The selection of an appropriate respirator 
depends on the type of activity anticipated in the 
laboratory. Training in the effective use of respirators is 
mandatory and requires yearly certification by the 
occupational health and safety program of each 
laboratorian’s organization or laboratory.
•	 Baseline serum samples should be stored in accordance with 
institutional policy for as long as the laboratory workers have 
the potential for exposure to influenza viruses containing an 
HA from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage.
•	 Laboratory workers must be required to be vaccinated 
against seasonal influenza unless an absolute medical 
contraindication exists.
•	 If a licensed HPAI H5N1 vaccine is available and no 
medical contraindications exist, the vaccine should be 
administered to all laboratory workers. A postvaccination 
serum sample should be collected, assessed for immune 
response, and stored in accordance with institutional 
policy, at least for the time in which the person continues 
to have the potential for exposure to influenza viruses 
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containing an HA from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 
lineage. An assessment of the immune response should be 
made in consultation with appropriate medical 
professionals. If an Investigational New Drug (IND) is 
available, it should be considered in consultation with 
appropriate medical professionals.
•	 All staff working with influenza viruses containing an HA 
from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage should be 
enrolled in a medical surveillance program, based on 
institutional policy. A medical surveillance program should 
include a response plan to a confirmed or suspected 
exposure and the use of vaccination and antiviral 
treatment. Counseling and training should be provided 
regarding disease symptoms and protocols for reporting 
possible exposures and symptoms.
•	 Isolation and antiviral treatment protocols should be in 
place for exposed personnel on the basis of a site-specific 
risk assessment and the health-care practitioner’s 
clinical judgment.
Biocontainment Guidelines for Work with 
Influenza Viruses Containing an HA from 
the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 Lineage
A list of appropriate work practices, safety equipment, 
and engineering controls for the containment levels listed 
in the following sections are available in the BMBL manual 
(23). The biosafety level selected depends on a site-specific 
risk assessment. Work with influenza viruses containing the 
HA from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage may only be 
conducted in laboratories meeting one of the following four 
biosafety level options. (Guidelines derived from the BMBL 
manual and USDA Guidelines for Avian Influenza Viruses [11].) 
1. BSL-4 and Animal BSL-4
Work with influenza viruses containing the HA from the 
A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage may be conducted in 
BSL-4 and animal BSL-4 (ABSL-4) containment levels. A 
comprehensive list of BSL-4 and ABSL-4 practices, procedures, 
containment, equipment, and facility requirements are 
available in the BMBL manual (23).  No additional provisions 
for work with influenza viruses containing the HA from 
the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage are provided in this 
document for BSL-4 and ABSL-4 containment levels.
2. BSL-3 Agriculture, with the Following 
Provisions
BSL-3 agriculture (BSL-3-Ag) conditions are appropriate 
for work with open-caged or loosely housed animals 
infected with influenza viruses containing an HA from 
the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage. BSL-3-Ag facilities 
have containment features of ABSL-3 facilities, as well as 
enhancements of features common in BSL-4 facilities. A list of 
BLS-3-Ag biocontainment features, work practices, equipment, 
and engineering controls are outlined in the BMBL manual 
and USDA Guidelines for Avian Influenza Viruses (11,23). In 
addition, the following provisions also are recommended. 
•	 Personnel quarantine policy: Laboratory staff members 
and visitors are restricted from having contact with any 
susceptible avian species for at least 5 days after last possible 
contact with the virus. The prohibition includes but is not 
limited to contact with any avian wildlife, pet birds, 
backyard poultry, birds at county and state fairs, 
commercial poultry operations, and zoos. Local 
institutional policy must require that employees and 
visitors read the quarantine policy and acknowledge by 
signature their agreement to comply with that policy. 
Laboratories that work with HPAI viruses should not be 
close to avian colonies. No commercial poultry flocks 
should be located within 0.5 mile (0.8 km) of the facility 
or any other avian colonies (e.g., backyard flock, aviary, 
or zoo) within 328 feet (100 m) of the facility.
•	 Personal protective equipment (PPE): PPE used should 
include the following: 1) disposable hood or head cover; 
2) protective eyewear (e.g., safety glasses); 3) respiratory 
protection (preferably PAPRs); 4) disposable double gloves; 
5) disposable protective suit (e.g., wrap-back disposable 
gown and olefin protective suit or coveralls); 6) and 
disposable shoe or foot covers. Before leaving the 
containment area, PPE must be decontaminated by an 
effective and validated method (e.g., use of an autoclave or 
sprayed disinfectant) with activity against influenza virus.
3. BSL-3 Enhanced, with the Following Provisions
These conditions are appropriate for in vitro work with 
influenza viruses containing the HA from the A/goose/
Guangdong/1/96 lineage.
•	 Personnel quarantine policy (see previous section)
•	 PPE (see previous section)
•	 Air handling: HEPA filtration of laboratory exhaust air 
is mandatory. The exhaust system must have a sealed 
ductwork system from the containment barrier to the filter. 
The heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system must 
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be designed and operated in a way that prevents airflow 
reversals under failure conditions.
•	 Showers: A gown-in, shower-out protocol should be used 
to enforce changing out of street clothes.
•	 Decontamination of laboratory liquid effluents: Liquid 
effluents originating from laboratories should be collected 
locally and chemically disinfected or heat treated or 
collected and processed in a central effluent decontamination 
system before being released into the local sanitary system. 
The decontamination of shower and toilet effluents is not 
a requirement if appropriate practices and procedures are 
in place for primary containment.
4. Animal BSL-3 Enhanced, with the Following 
Provisions
ABSL-3 conditions are appropriate for work with influenza 
viruses containing the HA from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 
lineage that involves animals housed in caging systems. 
•	 Personnel quarantine policy (see previous section)
•	 Air handling (see previous section)
•	 Showers (see previous section)
•	 Decontamination of laboratory liquid effluents (see 
previous section)
•	 PPE (see previous section)
•	 Special caging: Animals infected with influenza viruses 
containing the HA from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 
lineage must be housed in primary biocontainment units. 
Containment at the cage level can be achieved in several 
ways depending on preference and animal size. For 
example, primary biocontainment housing can include a 
containment cage or rack system, flexible film isolator, or 
glove box. Caging should be ventilated, and all the exhaust 
air should be HEPA filtered. The primary barrier system 
housing the animal cages must be installed and operated 
in a way that prevents airflow reversals and minimizes the 
effect on adjacent spaces. Static microisolators do not 
prevent air from leaking into the laboratory space.
•	 Decontamination of solid animal wastes: All animal 
tissues, carcasses, and bedding originating from the animal 
room must be decontaminated by an effective and 
validated method (e.g., use of an autoclave), preferably 
before leaving the containment barrier. If an autoclave is 
not conveniently located in areas where infectious 
materials or animals (or both) are housed or are 
manipulated, distinct practices should be developed for 
transport of infectious materials to designated alternative 
locations within the facility. An appropriate final method 
of disposal of carcasses of large infected animals 
(i.e., incineration or other approved means) should be used.
Diagnostic Specimens
Laboratory workers who process samples or perform 
non–culture-based diagnostic testing on original specimens 
suspected to contain influenza viruses containing the HA from 
the A/goose/ Guangdong/1/96 lineage virus should perform 
the work in a BSL-2 or higher laboratory with the following 
enhancements:
•	 All personnel must wear a disposable, wrap-around gown; 
shoe covers; an N95 respirator with eye protection or a 
face shield; or PAPR and must put on two pairs of gloves 
inside the room before beginning work. Persons must be 
appropriately trained and those wearing N95 respirators 
fit tested in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.134 (available 
at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_ 
document?p_id=12716&p_table=standards). 
•	 When exiting the laboratory room, personnel must discard 
both pairs of gloves, shoe covers, gowns, and respirator in 
a biohazard bag inside the room. Personnel should not 
wear PPE outside of the laboratory and must remove PPE 
before exiting the laboratory.
•	 Personnel who wear eyeglasses without a face shield while 
working in the BSL-2 laboratory must thoroughly wash 
the eyeglasses with a germicidal soap before taking them 
out of the laboratory. 
•	 All activities involving infectious materials must be 
conducted in biological safety cabinets or other physical 
containment devices within the laboratory. Work 
conducted in open vessels should not be performed on an 
open bench.
•	 Work surfaces of biological safety cabinets and other 
containment equipment must be decontaminated when 
work with infectious materials is finished.
•	 Small hand tools and similar items to be removed from 
the laboratory must first be decontaminated with 
appropriate disinfectants using suggested contact times 
per institutional biosafety guidelines. If feasible, the 
laboratory should have special engineering and design 
features to ensure directional airflow from clean to 
potentially contaminated areas.
A list of appropriate work practices, safety equipment, and 
engineering controls for BSL-2 containment are available in the 
BMBL manual (23). This work might include the use of the 
polymerase chain reaction or other in vitro diagnostic methods 
but not virus propagation. The sample may be placed in lysis 
buffer and only then handled outside of a biosafety cabinet 
in BSL-2 for molecular testing. The method of destruction 
(e.g., lysis buffer) must be safety tested to verify destruction of the 
live virus before removal of the agent to a lower biosafety level.
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After a sample is identified as positive for influenza virus 
containing the HA from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage, 
storage of the material may be continued under these BSL-2 
enhanced conditions. However, any other manipulations or 
additional work with the material or any subsequent related 
virus isolates should be conducted only in BSL-3 enhanced 
or higher containment, as described in a previous section for 
work with the virus (24).
NIH Guidelines for Research Involving 
Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid 
Molecules 
The NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or 
Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules remain applicable to this and 
other research involving recombinant DNA, including review 
and approval by an Institutional Biosafety Committee (see 
section III-D-7 and Appendix G-II-C-5 of the NIH guidelines) 
(25). The NIH guidelines are available online (http://oba.
od.nih.gov/oba/rac/Guidelines/NIH_Guidelines.htm).
The recent amendment to the NIH guidelines regarding 
mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus focuses on 
the subset of research with the HPAI H5N1 viruses that are 
transmissible among mammals by respiratory droplets. The 
biosafety recommendations in this document apply to all 
research with influenza viruses containing an HA from the 
A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage, and  they are consistent 
with the NIH guidelines for research with mammalian-
transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus.
Conclusion
The recommendations in this report are intended to 
provide persons and laboratories with baseline guidance for 
working safely with influenza viruses containing an HA from 
the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage. Application of these 
recommendations should be carried out in conjunction with 
a site-specific and agent-specific risk assessment; biosafety 
containment and practices may be further enhanced or 
customized for a specific research project.
These recommendations are an important addition to 
the collective set of biosafety recommendations for research 
with these specific influenza viruses and will be reviewed 
periodically and refined as additional experience is gained. 
The ultimate effectiveness of these recommendations in 
preventing laboratory-acquired infections and other releases 
of these viruses out of biocontainment depends on the work 
being conducted by properly trained workers who understand 
the hazards posed by these materials.
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